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ABSTRACT:  The  world  is  passing  through  the  most  difficult  economic  and  financial  crisis  in  the 
history, which severely affects its stability in the long term, risking an uncontrolled slide into chaos and 
uncertainty. The housing market crisis emerged in the United States in July 2007, due to multiple 
interferences  generated  by  the  globalization,  has  spread  to  other  regions,  triggering  the  world 
economy into recession. The study is trying to present the main causes and characteristics of the crisis, 
with special attention to its impact on Romania, which has witnessed a severe economic downturn in 
the first half of 2009, registering a sharp decline in industrial production, construction sector, exports 
and also in the lending activity. To deal with high budget deficit and liquidity pressures in the short 
term a financing agreement with international organizations has been concluded. But, in the long term, 
the  external  debt  burden  is  increasing,  the  sustainable  development  of  Romania  facing  new  risks 
arising from both the global crisis and the internal vulnerabilities.  
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The acute adversity of the international financial crisis impact, we believe, lies not in the huge 
size of the losses it has caused (estimated at over USD 4,000 billion just for the financial system), but 
in the threat for the credibility of the development capitalist model, based on free market forces.  
Investor’s confidence in the capability of markets to automatically adjust its dysfunctions has 
drastically fallen and the rise of unemployment and poverty as consequences of the global crisis could 
severely damage the political and social framework, particularly in the less developed countries.  
The turbulences on the international financial markets arising from the US housing market crisis 
emerged in July 2007,  have turned drastic in the second half of 2008. Despite expectations of an 
intervention by the Federal Reserves and / or the U.S. government for its rescue, only one week after 
the nationalization of Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac, two giants of the financial world, at mid September 
2008 the investment bank Lehman Brothers, a reference name on capital markets, has been left to fall 
into bankruptcy, which has degenerated into the slump of the stock exchanges capitalization indices, all 
over the world.  
The  processes  of  globalization  and  liberalization  of  trade  and  free  capital  movement  have 
proved  to  be  factors,  although  we  can  not  say  that  they  have  caused,  but  at  least  favoured  the 
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uncontrolled spread of financial derivatives, including bad mortgages backed securities, which became 
“toxic” assets. In the absence of adequate financial transactions control and supervision of global risk 
monitoring and warning, the protection systems at the national level have failed one after the other, 
opposing a low resistance to the crisis force of expansion and contamination.  
The  market  economy  under  the  current  global  crisis,  has  been  forced  once  more  (if  still 
necessary!),  to  show  that  competitive  market  forces  can  not  solve  alone  the  issues  of  economic 
sustainability,  especially  when  the  problems  of  the  environment,  production  and  consumption,  at 
regional, national and international levels have worsened. For this reason, in many recent international 
meetings at high level there has been a common desire to find remedies to counter the crisis effects and 
to reform the national and international financial systems.  
 
 Causes of the global crisis and counteracting its adverse effects measures  
To address the adverse effects of the financial crisis it is absolutely necessary to know the 
causes that have generated it and to implement policies and resources coherently connected on short, 
medium  and  long  terms,  at  the  local,  regional,  national  and  international  levels.  
            The crisis that the world is going through reveals the combination of traditional causes of the 
economic and financial crisis in general, with other non traditional, specific ones.  
Among the main traditional causes of the economic and financial crisis are: the credit boom to 
excessive large scale; the sharp rise in asset prices, particularly in the housing market; lending over the 
exposures  limits  to  economic  agents  or  persons  less  solvent  or  even  non solvent  (the  sub prime 
mortgage debtors); the failure in market discipline; the distortion of risk information and asset pricing.  
Regarding the non traditional causes, especially the ones related to the financial crisis, we can 
mention, first of all, the extent and depth of the sub prime crisis concerning: the uncontrolled growth of 
a sui generis origin and distribute model; an inordinate appetite for profit that has fuelled the growth in 
demand for high risk assets; the ex ante ignorance and ex post uncertainty regarding the risk associated 
with stock market values, based on mortgages, derivative financial products and credit default swaps 
transactions;  the  lack  of  an  appropriate  corporate  governance  and  the  excessive  incentives  for  the 
financial institutions managers.  
In our opinion, the root cause of the international financial crisis lies in exacerbating the role of 
financial instruments, of the nominal (monetary) economy compared to the real economy, in terms of 
ensuring the prerequisites for sustainable development. This exacerbation was based on the speculative 
component of the free market economy model, beyond its admissible and controllable limits. 
 It is worth mentioning that, during the years leading up to the crisis, the planet monetary axe 
dangerously  slipped  from  the  West  to  the  East  under  the  pressures  of  global  financial  imbalance 
deepening due to the accumulation, one the one hand, of huge international reserves in Asia (mainly 
China and Japan) and, on the other hand, of huge debt in the USA which generated uncontrolled capital 
flows.     
The  growth  of  the  number  of  financial  intermediaries,  of  derivatives  and  other  financial 
instruments has neglected the mathematical truth under which the derivative of 10 order of 0 is not 
otherwise than zero. Furthermore, in the real economy too, the multiplication of intermediaries in the 
relationship  production     consumption,  beyond  their  positive  contribution  to  the  improvement  of 
performances in production and in economic and social efficiency of consumption, does not mean 
something else than a false, unreal value added, with obvious parasitic and inflationary characteristics, 
inducing entropy in economy and society.  
Without intending to carry out a detailed list of causes, we would like to mention the major 





rating agencies that have not been able to draw “early warnings”  in due time in order to prevent the 
eruption of such financial turbulences on capital markets.  
At the first signs of the financial crisis in the United States it was supposed that the advanced 
economies  of  Europe  shouldn’t  be  affected,  but  the real  estate  markets  in  some  countries  (United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Spain) entered the crisis in 2008, suffering significant losses and triggering panic 
throughout  the  financial  sector.  By  the  end  of  2008,  the  effects  on  Europe  had  expanded  both  in 
territory  (Germany,  France,  Sweden,  Benelux  etc.)  and  sectors  (including  housing  and  automotive 
industry).  The  primary  capital  markets  have  also  entered  the  crisis,  which  required  the  States 
intervention  through  nationalization,  in  whole  or  in  part,  of  the  credit  institutions  with  liquidity 
problems, spending huge amounts of public money.  
The  secondary  capital  markets,  respectively,  their  indexes  of  market  capitalization,  have 
suffered a fall down to 20 percent in only a few weeks (end of September and the first half of October 
in 2008). Iceland was on the verge of financial collapse at the sovereign level, being saved in extremis, 
by the nationalization of three major banks, with financial assistance from the IMF.  
Paradoxically, despite the insignificant proportion of toxic assets in their banking system, the 
emerging countries of Central and Eastern Europe, escaped from an experimental system of command 
economy and going through a transition to a market economy, have also been exposed to the effects of 
the crisis, mainly due to their excessive openness to the foreign capital, including the financial one, 
sometimes of pure speculative nature.  
The effects of the crisis on emerging European countries have been multiplied by their super 
positioning to the persistent inflationary pressures caused by the rise of energy, raw materials and 
agricultural  products  global  prices,  during  2007  until  the  second  half  of  2008.  Moreover,  in  this 
context, a flight of foreign capital has been noticed, some of these countries (Hungary, Romania, Czech 
Republic, Poland) facing a sharp depreciation of their currencies and the decline of investors appetite, 
which  resulted  in  an  increase  in  external  financial  imbalances.  Among  the  emerging  European 
countries, the Baltic countries seem to have been most affected, in October 2008 and April 2009, the 
international rating agencies having successively degraded their country risk. 
In debating financial crisis topic, it is worth mentioning the consensus upon its effects on the 
real economy, taking the form of a global recession, which affects more or less every country in the 
world. At the end of 2008, the IMF experts, counting on the flexibility of market economies, still hoped 
for a quick recovery from the crisis, but in a context of a coherent response from the public authorities. 
However, during the first months of 2009 it was already clear that the economic fundamentals were not 
strong enough to improve the financial institutions in many key markets.  
Accordingly, the IMF, having revised four times its figures in 2009 (lately in October), foresees 
a contraction of the global economy by 1.1 percent this year (see IMF, 2009, World Economic Outlook 
– Sustaining the Recovery, October). A UN report published in May 2009 predicts an even more severe 
decline in the world economy, by more than 2 percent (see UN, 2009, World Economic Situation and 
Prospects 2009, May).  
The  interim  forecast  (released  in  September  2009)  of  the  European  Commission  foresee  a 
decrease  in  GDP  in  each  EU  member  country,  particularly  in  Germany  ( 5.1  percent),  Italy  ( 5 
percent), the United Kingdom ( 4.3 percent), Spain ( 3.7 percent), France ( 2.1 percent). In terms of 
relative size, the most affected are the Baltic countries, their economic contraction touching 2 digits, 
between 10 12 percent. More than that, Latvia is likely to enter a financial collapse in the event of 
public spending remedies failure. 
The turbulences in international financial markets and their negative effects require decisive 
action at the national and international level to avoid an even more severe contraction of the world 





Given the overall impact of the financial crisis with a clear potential to trigger an economic 
crisis  of  major  proportions  and  duration,  the  competent  international  institutions  or  organizations 
(including UN, World Bank, IMF, EU, etc.), to the various high level meetings of the Member States 
have  discussed  and  agreed  on  a  series  of  measures  for  counteracting  the  effects  of  the  crisis  and 
restoring the confidence in financial markets.  
As we know, a number of European banks in difficulty have been saved, at least temporarily, by 
the state intervention in England, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. This suggests the need for a 
systemic plan for Europe in order to strengthen financial institutions, taking into account the fact that 
certain  actions  fragmentized  at  the  national  level  may  prove  ineffective.  Thus,  a  more  intensive 
cooperation  of  the  stakeholders  in  the  stabilization  and  consolidation  of  financial  markets  seem 
appropriate, particularly for the implementation of reforms on regulation and supervision of financial 
markets. Any postponement of the implementation of reforms in this area may prove counterproductive 
in the medium and long run.  
To understand and motivate better possible solutions we must classify the effects of the crisis 
according to their action on short and respectively on long term, this issue depending on the duration of 
the crisis on the one hand and its economic and social consequences on the other hand. In analyzing the 
effects of the crisis in the context of coherent anti crisis programs and measures we must take into 
account not only their  negative side but also the opportunities created by  the process of  "creative 
destruction" that must be highlighted.  
The international financial crisis has drawn attention to the need, firstly, to take emergency 
measures and, secondly, to implement certain reforms in structural policies, to avoid a prolonged global 
recession.  
Increasing and broadening the financial crisis, triggered in the United States and extended in 
other countries, is a matter of concern, at the highest degree, for the decision makers of economy and 
society, at macro, mezzo, micro and global levels. The evolution of this crisis, initially emerged as a 
problem of insolvency fuelled by a lack of confidence in the credit system, became more and more a 
factor of turbulence for the global economy. For this reason, considerable efforts have been devoted to 
the identification of solutions to rebuild the credibility of the credit system and to resume its normal 
functioning.  
Although we can not say that there is a miracle solution ( "one size fits all"), some of the 
experts view points regarding the consistent, clear and coordinated approach of the issues of security 
bank liabilities, separation of bad assets and recapitalization of the institutions concerned.  
The idea of systemic plans for safeguarding the financial markets by increasing the prudence, 
the  supervision  and  the  institutional  regulation  is  more  and  more  accredited.  From  this  viewpoint 
clearly emerges the role of public   private partnerships in the financial sector, reducing the rate of 
exclusiveness of regulation solely by the market forces.  
Putting in place emergency measures such as the limitation of the borrowing through specific 
means is meant rather to overcome the financial crisis in the short term. Instead, the implementation of 
structural reforms of the global financial system on long term aims at the prevention of recurrence of 
such crisis phenomena in the future and requires special measures. A better regulatory and monitoring 
framework  should  be  designed  to  help  the  speeding  up  of  financial  innovation  for  the  benefit  of 
everybody and not for speculative purposes, by favouring a social minority.  
On the agenda of the governments, as challenges for debates and exchange of experiences, 
pointing a long run horizon are, to varying degrees, financial issues related to competition, incentives 
for prudent behaviour, consumers’ protection, improvement of financial education and of corporate 





At the global level, on the occasion of the high level Summit of October 2008, the EU countries 
have agreed, in principle, to form a common front against the global financial crisis, through a rescue 
plan of the banking system, by the allocation of about EUR 2000 billion from budget funds. This plan, 
called the "new Bretton Woods", was proposed by the President Sarkozy (France's presidency of the 
EU at that time), an idea resumed in Washington a month later, at the high level Summit of G 20. In 
this occasion, the world leaders committed to an Action Plan which was reviewed at G 20 London 
Summit in April 2009. The Action Plan set recommendations in order to strengthen transparency and 
accountability, enhance sound regulation, promote integrity in financial markets, reinforce international 
cooperation and reform international financial institutions.  
During the G 20 Summit which was held in 24 25
th September at Pittsburgh (USA) the world 
leaders recognized that  the process of world recovery and  repair is incomplete, in many countries 
unemployment  remaining  unacceptably  high  and  the  private  demand  being  still  weak.  As  a 
consequence, they agreed further actions to assure a sound recovery from the global economic and 
financial crisis, between them: launching a Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth, 
setting timetables for the reform of global financial system, mainly by raising capital standards and 
ending practices that lead to excessive risk taking, establishing the Financial Stability Board at the G 
20 level, in order to coordinate and monitor progress in strengthening financial regulation.  
An IMF report on Europe (See Regional Economic Outlook: Europe. How can we tackle the 
crisis, May 2009) draw the attention on the rate at which the emerging countries of Europe will emerge 
from the crisis that could be determined by the banking sector. Thus, measures to promote access to 
credit through the recapitalization of banks, could help to prevent a tightening of borrowing, support 
consumption and prevent a too long recession in some countries. This mechanism plays a leading role 
in the programs supported by the IMF, which provide funds specifically for the recapitalization of 
banks. The strengthening of transnational coordination among central banks, supervisory bodies and 
the governments of origin countries of banks and those of host countries are also very important. 
However, in 2009, European leaders appeared to be overwhelmed by the events of the crisis and 
the rapid deterioration of the economic situation, the measures planned or implemented, not being able 
to calm the capital markets, characterized by a persistent high volatility. In addition, the idea of an EU 
institution charged with the coordinated financial supervision of capital markets in Europe (watchdog) 
has led some politicians to express their concern about the functioning of the market economy, in terms 
of intervention measures and protectionist constraints, including the banking system. The powers of a 
new European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) 
still have to be agreed and defined in detail. Despite the unity of action displayed by the European 
leaders, there is an impression that, in fact, each one is trying to minimize the negative effects on their 
own account, within their national space.  
 
The impact of the global crisis on Romania’s economy  
During the first quarter of 2009 the gross domestic product of Romania fell by 2.6 percent 
compared to fourth quarter of 2008 (adjusted data taking into account the seasonal variations) and 6.4 
percent compared to first quarter 2008 (data not adjusted). The fourth quarter of 2008 witnessed a 
reduction of gross domestic product by 3.4 percent over the third quarter. The second quarter of 2009 
saw another decline of GDP, by 1.1 percent compared with the previous quarter and by 8.8 percent 
compared with the same period of 2008. So, according to the technical definition of a recession, i.e. a 
decline in GDP for two consecutive quarters, Romania has entered recession in 2009.  
The global crisis has seriously affected in 2009 the industrial sector, whose main branches are 
under the majority control of foreign capital and subsidiaries of multinational corporations, being more 





by 9.6 percent over the same period of last year (see Table 1). On sections, a decline by 10.8 percent 
has been recorded both in extractive industry and manufacturing. On industry groups, more severe 
production drop was in intermediate goods ( 15.3 percent) and durable consumer goods ( 17.4 percent).  
In the first eight months of 2009, compared with the same period of 2008, the biggest fall in the 
industrial  production  was  registered  in  manufacturing  of  basic  metals,  manufacture  of  other  non 
metallic mineral products and textiles. Other manufacturing industries in decline were clothes, paper 
and  paper  products,  chemicals  and  chemical  products,  rubber  and  plastics,  petroleum  products, 
furniture. Industries less affected by the crisis and where production has increased during the analyzed 
period (wood processing, publishing houses, printing and reproduction of recorded media, manufacture 
of electric equipment), even are not touching essential sectors of the economy, could see a more rapid 
recover.  
 
Table no. 1 
Indexes of industrial production in Romania 
  percent   
  August 2009 as compared with:  Jan-Aug.  2009/  
Jan-Aug. 2008    July 2009  August 2008 
Industry – total   84.2  94.7  90.9 
- on sections : 
Extractive Industry  103.5  84.4  88.5 
Manufacturing  81.5  92.9  89.6 
- on industry groups: 
Intermediate goods  93.9  94.1  85.9 
Capital goods  62.4  91.8  93.1 
Durable consumer goods  95.7  93.2  83.4 
Nondurable consumer goods  88.4  89.8  90.8 
Energy industry  100.9  107.1  98.3 
Source: National Institute of Statistics, Press Release no 205, 7 October 2009. 
 
Constructions and retail trade registered a decline in comparison with their "boom" in previous 
periods.  Transportations  and  banking  sectors  recorded  a  significant  fall  in  their  activity;  however, 
bankruptcies of banks did not occur, but lending activity entered a deadlock.  
In the first eight months of 2009, the exports of Romania fell by 19.1 percent and imports by 
36.6 percent respectively, compared to the same period in 2008 (see Table 2). The higher decrease rate 
of imports than the one of exports has led to the lowering of the trade deficit to EUR 5.8 billion in first 
eight months of 2009 compared to the deficit of EUR 15.4 billion in the same period of 2008. On the 
one  hand,  this  reduction  can  be  considered  favourable  in  terms  of  short  term  improvement  of 
Romania’s external financial balance, but on the other hand it is unfavourable as regards the long term 









Table no. 2  
Exports and Imports of Romania in the first eight months of 2008 and 2009 
  EUR million   




Exports FOB  Imports CIF  Sold FOB/CIF 
2008  2009  2009/2008 
  %   
2008  2009  2009/2008 
  %   
2008  2009 
Intra UE 27  16085.7  13688.5       85.1  26680.2  17799.5       66.7   10594.5   4111.0 
Extra UE 27  6868.9  4871.7       70.9  11712.0  6558.3       56.0    4843.1   1686.6 
TOTAL  22954.6  18560.2  80.9  38392.2  24357.8  63.4  -15437.6  -5797.6 
Source: National Institute of Statistics, Press Release no 208, 12 October 2009.  
 
The drop in exports and imports has been caused by the effects of the global crisis, mainly of 
EU  market,  that  has  contracted  both  the  external  demand  for  the  Romanian  products  and  the 
international offer for Romanian imports.  
The consequences of reducing the Romanian foreign trade must be taken into account on short, 
medium  and  long  term,  especially  with  regard  to  macroeconomic  performance.  Now  Romania  is 
opened to international markets, first to the market of EU countries, which means a very important role 
of the external demand for the development of the national economy that has become much more 
vulnerable to the cyclical movements in the international businesses. This vulnerability is accentuated 
by the pattern of an emerging economy.  
In 2009, despite the recession, or paradoxically because of it, the balance of payments current 
account has improved (see Table 3). Compared to EUR 11.5 billion current account deficit in January   
August 2008, in the same period of 2009 the deficit has fallen more than 4 times, reaching only EUR 
2.5 billion, mainly due to the contraction of the trade gap. The current account deficit was fully covered 
by foreign investments, amounted to EUR 3.2 billion during the first eight months of 2009.  
Besides the effects, sometimes contradictory, in the short term   particularly the downturn of the 
economy   in the medium and long term it is expected that the international financial crisis and global 
recession should adversely affect the economic and social development in Romania.  
Table no. 3  
The BoP current account in the first eight months of the years 2008 and 2009 
  EUR million  
  January- August 2008  January- August 2009 
Credit  Debit  Net   Credit  Debit  Net 
Current account 
     (A + B + C) 
36 154   47 599   -11 445   28 760   31 209  -2 449 
A. Goods and services 
     a. Goods 
     b. Services 







 12 481 








 3 923 
 69  
B.  Incomes  1 507  5 222  -3 715  795    2 243    -1 448 
C. Current transfers  6 116  1 813  4 303  4 674  1 683    2 991 





Despite the fragility of any economic projection, which is susceptible to numerous revisions due 
to the volatility of international context, we will use the medium and long term forecast developed by 
the Romania’s National Commission of Prognosis (NCP), trying to draw some conclusions concerning 
a preliminary finding on the crisis impact in the Romanian economy at the macroeconomic level.  
According to this forecast (see Table 4), after a GDP decline in 2009 by 7.7 percent, in 2010 the 
indicator is expected to mark a modest recovery of 0.5 percent. In the years to come the growth of GDP 
is expected to accelerate, making possible the recovery of previous economic decline only in the late 
2013. It is worth mentioning that, having in view the contraction of the economy during the first half in 
2009 (6.2 percent in the first quarter and 8.8 percent in the second quarter as compared with the same 
quarters  of  2008)  a  decline  more  sharp  than  expected  of  Romania’s  GDP  would  worse  all 
macroeconomic projections. 
The  forecast  for  2009  shows  a  drop  of  the  gross  value  added  in  all  sectors:  industry  ( 5.8 
percent), agriculture ( 7.8 percent), constructions ( 13.9 percent), services ( 5.9 percent), reflecting the 
vulnerable structure of the Romanian economy and the adverse impact of the global recession.     
In 2009, the final consumption is expected to decrease by 12.6 percent, due to the contraction 
by  12.7  percent  in  the  individual  consumption  of  households  and  by  12.0  percent  in  the  public 
administration consumption.  
 
Table no. 4  
The projection of main macroeconomic indicators 
  percentage change as compared with the previous year   
  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014 
GDP       7.1       7.7        0.5       2.4      3.7      4.4  5,2 
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Gross  Fixed  Capital 
Formation  
19.3   11.0  2.0  5.3  6.7  7.5  8.0 
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(annual average)  7.85  5.5  3.7  3.2       2.8      2.5  2.3 
















Source: National Commission for Prognosis of Romania, September 2009. 
 
The  most  severe  drops  in  2009  are  estimated  for  imports  ( 34  percent)  and  exports  ( 15 
percent). It is interesting to note that after this major decline, starting with 2010 imports and exports are 
expected to resume their growth.  
The exchange rate lei / euro is expected to deteriorate in 2009 up to 4.25 and, after that, a 
modest improvement is foreseeable, depending on the recovery of exports. 
 It should be noted that the crisis will bring changes in the geographical directions of Romania’s 
foreign trade, indicating a modest growth of the weight of the extra EU trade, both for exports and 
imports. This can be explained also by the fact that in relative terms, the foreign trade of Romania has 
reached a certain level of "saturation" with the EU countries and, on the other hand, the globalization of 
markets and the openness of the Romanian economy are offering a wider choice for trade opportunities, 
mainly in Asia.  
The  biggest  challenge  for  the  prospects  of  Romania’s  development  is  related  to  the 
sustainability of the external financial situation revealed by the evolution of external debt both on short 
term and medium and long term (see Table 5).  
 
Table no. 5  
The short, medium and long term external debt of Romania 
  EUR billion   
 
External debt  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009* 
TOTAL  18.4  21.5  30.9  41.2  58.5  73.4  76.9 
-  short term  2.7  3.2  6.3  12.6  19.8  22.2  16.8 
- medium and long term  15.7  18.3  24.6  28.6  38.7  51.2  60.1 
* 31
st of August 2009 
Source: National Bank of Romania, Interactive Databank. 
 
Under  the  circumstances  of  falling  contribution  of  the  autonomous  flows  (foreign  direct 
investments) for covering the current account deficit and the increase of compensatory flows (external 
loans), the medium and long term external debt of Romania has risen more than three times over the 
last six years, exceeding EUR 51 billion at the end of 2008. The short term external debt has increased 
even faster, almost ten times in six years, mainly due to the boom in imports and consumption credit. 
But an excessive rise of the short term external debt puts great pressure on the currency market, risking 
a crash of the national currency. On the other hand, the accumulation of a large foreign debt in the 
medium and long run, accompanied by high levels of annual services, could weaken the international 
position of Romania and undermine its sustainable development. In 2009, the medium and long term 
external debt of Romania continued to grow reaching EUR 60 billion at 31st of August, mainly due to 
the loan from IMF and other international organizations. 
 
 





 Prerequisites of the financing agreement with international organizations   
To deal with the foreseeable difficulties as a consequence of the financial crisis, Romania has 
concluded a financing agreement for a two year total loan of EUR 20 billion with IMF, EU, EBRD and 
World Bank, under the conditions of reducing the budget deficit and freezing wages in the public 
sector. Regarded as a "safety belt", the loan is intended to support the budget deficit and economic 
activity, to maintain the euro lei exchange rates at sustainable levels for the economy and population 
and to boost the recovery of lending activity. The financial assistance and the economic policies are 
intended to cope with liquidity pressures in the short term, to improve competitiveness and to redress 
the macroeconomic and financial imbalances.  
The real causes of the accelerated growth of Romania’s external financing requirements are 
related  to  growing  vulnerabilities  of  the  financial  situation  which  resulted  from  macroeconomic 
imbalances  deepening,  particularly  the  savings investments  balance,  from    pressures  on  external 
balance of payments emerged in recent years due to the deteriorating of current account and to the 
widening of trade deficit. The excessive increase in domestic private credit for consumption has fuelled 
the massive increase of imports. At the same time, reducing the relative contribution of foreign direct 
investment to financing the current account deficit has increased the short term and medium long term 
external debt mostly of the private sector (including banks). The deterioration of the current account is 
also explained by the slowing of current transfers from the Romanians working abroad and the increase 
in the income balance deficit, especially because of growing profits repatriation and/or reinvested by 
the  foreign  companies  and  also  of  increased  interests  related  to  the  external  debt.  All  these  were 
accompanied by a modest rate of EU funds absorption in the first two years of accession, despite its 
low level of development, Romania being a net contributor to the EU budget.  
The gross financing requirements for 2009 estimated by the IMF and the National Bank of 
Romania standing for EUR 44 billion, from which a financial gap of around EUR 12 billion  has 
resulted, to be covered by an external loan, is not adequately sustained in our view, at least according to 
published information, sometimes contradictory or confusing.  
According to our estimates, the reversal of imports and exports growth rates in favour of the 
latter may lead to a positive contribution of the net exports to GDP on the demand side. It is expected 
that this contribution should partially offset the decline in domestic demand, which may bear a more 
favourable GDP trend in 2009 compared to the worst case scenario considered by IMF and NBR. The 
estimate for foreign direct investments of EUR 3.5 billion in 2009 seems to be under sized, compared 
with the previous year (EUR 9 billion) and also with the amount of FDI during the first eight months of 
2009 (EUR 3.2 billion), mostly under the circumstances of an expected improvement of investors 
perception about Romania, including due to the conclusion of the Stand By Arrangement.  
In our opinion, under the circumstances of many uncertainties in the international environment, 
which  could  suppose  also  the  possible  rebound  of  the  world  economy  since  2010,  a  financing 
agreement over a shorter period would have been suitable. In case the pessimistic assumptions on the 
Romanian economy would be confirmed toward the end of 2009, an extension of this agreement could 
be negotiated. However, a much more advantageous financing solution for Romania, as an EU member 
state, would have been the qualification for obtaining a credit line on 6 months or one year from FCL 
(“Flexible Credit Line”), a funding modality initiated by the IMF in the month of March 2009 replacing 
SLF (“Short Term Liquidity Facility”). It is worth mentioning that, this new credit line is released for 
the prevention of crises in countries with very  strong fundamentals, policies, and track records of 
policy implementation, which is not totally the case of Romania.  
In fact, in our view, the logic of the agreement with the IMF is based on monetary coordinates 
designed inside the NBR perimeter. Starting with the top priority of Romania's accession to the Euro 





conformity to convergence criteria (in particular those on inflation, nominal interest rates on long term 
and exchange rate) has become the fundamental objective in the medium and long term.  
The threat of a possible collapse of the national currency, due to internal and external pressures 
accumulation doubled by the lack of immediate liquidity of assets in which the international reserves of 
Romania have been invested and with the reduction of the minimum reserve requirements on foreign 
currency liabilities by commercial banks could trigger an uncontrolled inflation, missing the objective 
of joining the Euro Zone. It is worth mentioning that the external financing requirements in 2009 have 
arisen in the context of an imminent crisis on the currency market.  
The inconsistency of tax and fiscal policies of government has worried the monetary authorities 
of Romania, but also the European Commission. Under these circumstances, the central bank has been 
forced  to  resort  to  international  arbitration  for  imposing  the  fiscal  discipline  under  a  multilateral 
financing agreement: IMF, EU, EBRD and World Bank.  
The  Stand By  Arrangement  with  the  IMF  bring  a  number  of  advantages  for  Romania, 
implementing the necessary fiscal and monetary policies, including the fiscal discipline, ensuring the 
macroeconomic  stability  in  the  context  of  conditionality  and  performance  criteria,  improving  the 
perception of foreign investors, stabilizing the foreign exchange market, ameliorating the predictability, 
sustainability and coherence of economic policies, supporting the banking sector and its strengthening, 
including the recover of lending activity, both for businesses and population.  
Beyond these advantages, there are also several risks arising from the agreement with the IMF, 
such as creating a negative image regarding the financial situation of Romania, which would make a 
"bailout" necessary, limiting the government room of manoeuvre in the implementation of various 
economic policies, including the predictable reduction of the budget allocation in accordance  with 
national priorities, such as infrastructure development, export promotion and environment protection. 
The loan of about EUR 20 billion will push the external debt towards excessive levels, with annual 
services potentially unsustainable in the medium and long run. The social effects generated by the loss 
of jobs, accompanied by the non indexation of wages and pensions, can have adverse economic costs 
that are difficult to estimate. Any non conformation of Romania to the conditions and performance 
criteria specified in the agreement, which involves postponements or worse, cancellation of the next 
instalments, could lead to adverse effects on the economy, including on the prospects of sustainable 
development.  
A weak point of the procedures backing the agreement with the IMF stands for the lack of an 
alternative, for example compared with a loan from another country and/or with a launch of Romanian 
government bonds on national and international capital markets, considered too restrictive a priori. In 
this context, the comparative terms of loans could be made known, so that one can be sure that the most 
advantageous  borrowing  alternative  has  been  chosen.  In  this  way,  speculations  around  the 
conditionalities imposed by IMF and the confidentiality of certain clauses of the agreement could have 
been  avoided,  the  more  under  the  circumstances  of  increasing  the  financial  system  transparency, 
considered as a primary remedy for its recovery. 
According to the first review of Stand By Arrangement, the report of IMF staff team, following 
discussions with the Romanian authorities ended at mid August 2009, underline the contraction of 
economic activities much sharper than projected due to the combination of an unfavourable external 
environment  and  faster  retrenchment  of  domestic  demand  during  the  first  half  of  2009.  The  IMF 
experts brought many significant corrections to the macroeconomic framework projected 6 months 
before, confirming our doubts previously mentioned regarding their adequacy. For instance, the new 
figure for the gross financing requirements stands for EUR 41.5 billion (instead of EUR 44 billion) for 
2009, respectively EUR 2.5 billion less, following the corrections of current account deficit (down 





billion  up  to  EUR  34.5  billion,  mainly  due  to  the  corrections  of  net  foreign  direct  investments 
estimation from EUR 3.5 billion to EUR 5 billion. The most significant change suffered the estimates 
for the increase of gross international reserves   rather an adjustment parameter   respectively from 0 to 
EUR 4.5 billion, which made the amount of Romania’s external financial gap (EUR 11.5 billion instead 
of EUR 11.8 billion) to remain almost the same, justifying in this way the amount of the loan from IMF 
and other international organizations. 
 
 Concluding Remarks  
At global level: 
  the financial and economic international crisis highlighted once more the weaknesses of the 
capitalist financial system and of the free market mechanisms, particularly as regards the relationship 
real economy   nominal economy, transparency, monitoring and management of banking and financial 
risk, the defective activity of rating agencies, the negative impact of tax paradises and the lack of 
cooperation at the international level to reform the financial system, which should be subordinated to 
the needs of the real economy and not to the interests of financial institutions managers.  
  to clean up the toxic assets, the national and international mechanisms of prevention and also 
the  “polluter  pays”  principle  must  be  strengthened,  by  putting  in  place  more  efficient  supervision 
systems.  
   the  anti crisis  remedies  involve  an  intensification  of  public private  partnership,  based  on 
complementarities of the functions and objectives of the two sectors which must make compatible the 
economic  efficiency,  the  justice  and  social  equity  that  come  along  with  social  responsibility  of 
corporations and good governance.  
   the  application  of  business  ethics  principle  is  proved  to  be  indisputable  in  a  new  world, 
dominated by the power of money and profit. Ethics in business should coexist with the instruments 
against  corruption,  speculation  and  the  economic  and  social  parasitism  of  superfluous  financial 
intermediaries.  
   the  determination  and  the  decisions  of  the  G 7  and  G 20  Summits  on  reforming  the 
international financial system represent a promising beginning that should be continued with more 
concrete measures and actions, mainly by raising capital standards and ending practices that lead to 
excessive risk taking. 
  if the anti crisis measures undertaken at the global scale do not lead to the expected results, 
particularly as regards the reform of the financial system, the turbulences in the global economy might 
be prolonged indefinitely. If additional factors derived from other potential global crises (energy, food, 
environment) are interfering, there are more risks of adverse shocks for mankind.  
For Romania: 
  despite the negligible effects of the crisis on the banking system of Romania due to the limited 
exposure  to  the  toxic  assets,  the  measures  for  promoting  the  recovery  of  lending  through  the 
recapitalization of banks could help the rebound of the consumption credit support and the prevention 
of a too long recession.  
  the impact of the global crisis which has contracted the external demand particularly affects 
the real economy. According to the decline in GDP over the first two quarters in 2009 Romania has 
entered into recession.  
  viewing the economy vulnerabilities caused by the accelerated deterioration of the current 
account in recent years mainly due to the growth of trade deficit, Romania’s external financial position 
was on the edge of a crisis, which, in any way, would have rendered an external loan necessary to cover 





  the analytical foundation of the joint loan from the IMF World Bank EBRD EU summing 
EUR 20 billion over two years is raising debatable assumptions, in our opinion, the real reason being 
imposed by the NBR needs to avoid a currency crisis, firstly because of the lack of immediate liquidity 
of international reserves, apparently reassuring.  
  besides the negative impact on the Romanian economy, the crisis can stimulate the financial 
restructuring and reorganization, to develop new activities and gain new markets, taking into account 
the conditions of competitiveness and globalization, marked by challenges of the environmental crisis 
and the transition to a sustainable development.  
  because of the crisis impact on the state budget by cutting public funds, including for R&D 
and for environmental protection investments, the government should promote strategies in order to 
develop high technologies for saving energy, for recycling and waste treatment, while respecting the 
environment parameters and the requirements of Romania’s sustainable development.  
  there is a series of other dilemmas and related risks in the future caused by the general need to 
reduce the interest rate in contrast with the high level charged by banks in Romania and also by the 
recommendation to continue the trade liberalization policies in contrast with the trade protectionism 
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